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LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND AGENCIES 
Georgia Bureau of Investigation: Amend Chapter 3 of Title 35 of 
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to the Georgia 
Bureau of Investigation, so as to Prevent the Disclosure of a 
Subpoena Issued for Production of Electronic Communication 
Service Records for Computer or Electronic Devices that Are Used 
in Furtherance of Certain Offenses against Minors or Involving 
Trafficking of Persons for Labor or Sexual Servitude, to the 
Subscriber or Customer; Allow the Georgia Crime Information 
Center to Retain Fingerprints of Certain Individuals under Certain 
Circumstances and Submit such Fingerprints to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation; Provide for an Exchange of Information 
to Certain Entities; Provide for Removal of Fingerprints under 
Certain Circumstances; Provide for Fees; Amend Titles 20, 31, 37, 
and 49 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to 
Education, Health, Mental Health, and Social Services, 
Respectively, so as to Allow the Georgia Bureau of Investigation 
and, as Authorized, the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Retain 
Fingerprints when an Agency or Entity Is Participating in the 
Bureau’s Program; Provide for Related Matters; Repeal 
Conflicting Laws; And for Other Purposes 
CODE SECTIONS: O.C.G.A. §§ 20-1A-31, -32, -34, -38, -
39 (amended); 31-2-9 (amended); 31-
2A-7 (amended); 31-7-254 (amended); 
31-7-258 (amended); 31-7-259 
(amended); 35-3-4.1 (amended); 35-3-
4.3 (amended); 35-3-33 (amended); 37-
1-28 (amended); 49-2-14.1 (amended); 
49-2-14 (amended); 49-5-62–64 
(amended); 49-5-63, -64, -68–69.1 
(amended); 49-5-111 (amended) 
BILL NUMBER: SB 336 
ACT NUMBER: 411 
GEORGIA LAWS: 2018 Ga. Laws 507 
SUMMARY: The Act prohibits data carriers from 
disclosing to their customers the 
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existence of a subpoena issued for the 
production of the customers’ records. 
The Act also allows the Georgia 
Bureau of Investigation to retain the 
fingerprints of individuals working in 
certain professions that require 
background checks for the duration of 
employment. 
EFFECTIVE DATE: July 1, 2018; O.C.G.A. § 20-1A-39, 
January 1, 2019 
History 
Georgia Senate Bill (SB) 336 consists of two distinct legislative 
efforts. The original SB 336 prohibits data carriers from informing 
their customers of the existence of subpoenas seeking to obtain 
customers’ records. Georgia House of Representatives Bill (HB) 623, 
which was added to SB 336 by substitute, allows the Georgia Bureau 
of Investigation (GBI) to retain fingerprints collected during 
occupational licensing background checks in limited circumstances. 
This Peach Sheet evaluates each of these two sections separately. 
HB 623 
In 2012, Christina Hawkins assumed ownership of the Progressive 
Christian Academy in Macon, Georgia.1 Although Hawkins 
underwent a background check when she assumed ownership, 
officials later discovered that she had prior convictions for fraud, 
theft, possession of drug paraphernalia, and additional crimes.2 How 
could her numerous convictions have gone unnoticed? A state 
background check that Hawkins passed in Georgia failed to detect 
those prior convictions because they occurred in Florida.3 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Michael Klazema, Georgia Now Requires National Background Checks for Child Care Workers, 
BACKGROUNDCHECKS.COM (May 3, 2013), https://www.backgroundchecks.com/community/post=3984 
[https://perma.cc/E27X-3MUY]. 
 2. Allie Kuester, Woman Who Inspired Georgia Educator Background Check Law Arrested in 
Florida, MIND YOUR BUSINESS, INC. (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.mybinc.com/blog/woman-inspired-
georgia-educator-background-check-law-arrested-florida/ [https://perma.cc/C55Y-QX7L]. 
 3. Klazema, supra note 1. 
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Additionally, her convictions were under an alias, “Christina 
Perera.”4 In response to stories like this, the Georgia legislature 
passed a law requiring all childcare workers to pass national 
fingerprinting background checks.5 Although these extensive 
fingerprinting background checks cost more than the comparatively 
limited state background checks, the bill’s sponsor urged, “[i]t’s all 
about the safety of the children.”6 
Georgia law requires fingerprint background checks for various 
occupations involving work with children, patients, or the elderly.7 
The Georgia Department of Early Care and Learning (DECAL), the 
Georgia Department of Human Services (DHS), the Georgia 
Department of Community Health (DCH), and the Georgia 
Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities 
(DBHDD) each require fingerprint background checks.8 However, 
felons can still end up working in facilities caring for the most 
vulnerable of our population even with federal background check 
requirements. For example, Georgia law required childcare 
institutions under the DHS to administer fingerprint background 
checks every five years.9 Thus, an employee working in such a 
facility could be convicted of a felony after the background check 
and continue to work there undetected until the next required 
background check. However, as a practical matter, continual 
fingerprint checks impose additional costs on employers and 
inconvenience for employees undergoing the background checks. 
To address the need for real-time protection of Georgia’s children 
and elderly, HB 623—as it appears in SB 336—authorizes the GBI 
and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to retain fingerprints 
submitted for these national background checks.10 Thus, Georgia 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Id. 
 5. Nancy Badertscher, Deeper Checks on Child-Care Workers Coming, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec. 
8, 2013, 10:25 PM), https://www.myajc.com/news/state—regional/deeper-checks-child-care-workers-
coming/uZGFXgM99rTyYZAmEHn9EK/ [https://perma.cc/SL9W-JUP5]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 20-1A-31, 31-2-9 (2018). 
 8. O.C.G.A. §§ 20-1A-39, 49-2-14, 31-2-9, 37-1-28 (2018). 
 9. Video Recordings of Non-Civil Judiciary Committee Meeting at 38 min., 6 sec. (Mar. 12, 2018) 
(remarks by Rep. Andrew Welch (R-110th)), https://livestream.com/accounts/19771755/events/ 
7993559/videos/171466762 [https://perma.cc/ULW2-HMZG] [hereinafter Non-Civil Judiciary Video]. 
 10. See id. at 48 min., 59 sec. (remarks by Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)); see also HB 623 (HCS), 2018 
Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
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officials could be notified instantly if a childcare worker has been 
charged with a felony anywhere in the United States.11 Additionally, 
retention of fingerprint data could obviate the need for continual 
retesting. 
The Underlying SB 336 
In September 2009, the GBI’s Internet Crimes Against Children 
Task Force detected an IP address from Rome, Georgia, sharing 
suspected child pornography.12 A GBI agent subsequently obtained a 
subpoena from Comcast, the Internet provider for the IP address.13 In 
response to the subpoena, Comcast revealed that the IP address 
belonged to Charles Ralph Henderson.14 The GBI then obtained a 
search warrant and confiscated Henderson’s computer.15 The 
evidence stored on the computer led to Henderson’s conviction on 
four counts of sexual exploitation of children.16 
Subpoenas directed to Internet providers, like Comcast, have led to 
numerous charges of child pornography and other computer crimes.17 
Internet providers receiving subpoenas are often urged not to notify 
their customers who are being targeted by law enforcement.18 
Otherwise, customers aware of pending criminal investigations 
against them might delete the evidence necessary to sustain a 
conviction.19 In one copyright infringement case, for instance, 
Comcast informed its customer of the lawsuit against him and 
warned the customer that Comcast intended to reveal his identity in 
response to a subpoena.20 The customer subsequently wiped his hard 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See Non-Civil Judiciary Video, supra note 9, at 49 min., 9 sec. (remarks by Rep. Ed Setzler 
(R-35th)). 
 12. Henderson v. State, 320 Ga. App. 553, 554, 740 S.E.2d 280, 284 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). 
 13. Id., 740 S.E.2d at 284. 
 14. Id., 740 S.E.2d at 284. 
 15. Id., 740 S.E.2d at 284. 
 16. Id., 740 S.E.2d at 284. 
 17. See, e.g., United States v. Ortega, No. CR415-134, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147638 at *2 (S.D. 
Ga. 2015); Courtney v. State, 340 Ga. App. 496, 496, 797 S.E.2d 496, 496 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). 
 18. Michael Levenson, Power to Seize Phone, Net Records Is a ‘Sanctioned Fishing Expedition,’ 
Critics Say, BOS. GLOBE (July 16, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/07/16/concerns-
raised-over-prosecutors-power-seize-phone-internet-records/JKdVWqjFNUSMkaboOoAhZK/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/LWH8-Z26D]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Davis, No. 05-0316, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50955, at *4–5 (E.D. 
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drive clean before forensic examiners could confiscate it.21 Although 
the language in such subpoenas requests that Internet providers 
refrain from notifying users of the subpoena, some Internet providers 
will always warn subscribers unless they are legally compelled to 
keep quiet.22 
In response, legislators have sought to prevent Internet providers 
from warning subscribers of the existence of a subpoena against 
them. For example, the federally proposed Targeting Child Predators 
Act would amend 18 U.S.C. § 3486 to require Internet providers to 
wait 180 days before notifying subscribers of subpoenas requesting 
their personal information for child exploitation investigations.23 
Other states have prohibited Internet providers from notifying 
customers of subpoenas against them, regardless of the type of 
investigation,24 and SB 336 contains the same prohibitions. 
Bill Tracking 
Consideration and Passage by the Senate 
Senators Renee Unterman (R-45th), Butch Miller (R-49th), Gloria 
Butler (D-55th), and Joshua McKoon (R-29th) sponsored SB 336 in 
the Georgia Senate.25 The bill was read for the first time in the Senate 
on January 22, 2018, and was committed to the Senate Committee on 
                                                                                                                 
Pa. July 26, 2006). 
 21. Id. at *8. 
 22. Aaron Sankin, Meet Sonic, the Anti-Comcast, DAILY DOT (Apr. 7, 2015, 9:07 AM), 
https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/sonic-isp-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/XZH5-3QBW]. 
 23. House Committee Passes DeSantis Bill Targeting Child Predators, STATES NEWS SERVICE 
(Mar. 22, 2017), https://desantis.house.gov/2017/3/house-committee-passes-desantis-bill-targeting-
child-predators (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review). 
 24. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3016 (2018) (allowing an agency to apply for a court 
order directing Internet provider “not to notify any other person of the existence of the subpoena, court 
order or warrant for such period as the court deems appropriate”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.24 (West 
2018) (requiring Internet provider in certain circumstances to create backup copy of communications 
“[w]ithout notifying the subscriber”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-17b (2018) (allowing court to 
prohibit disclosure of subpoena for up to ninety days in certain circumstances); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
13, § 8103 (West 2018) (permitting delay of up to ninety days of required customer notification in 
“emergency” circumstances); W. VA. CODE § 62-1G-2(e) (2018) (“The electronic communications 
system or service . . . shall not disclose the existence of the subpoena or its response to the subpoena to 
the account holder identified in the subpoena.”). 
 25. Georgia General Assembly, SB 336, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-
US/display/20172018/SB/336 [https://perma.cc/F6FH-XF78] [hereinafter SB 336 Bill Tracking]. 
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Judiciary.26 On February 8, 2018, the Committee amended the bill in 
part and favorably reported it by Committee substitute.27 
The Committee substitute included most of the introduced bill’s 
text, but a few subsections were slightly changed.28 The Committee 
updated the title to reflect the bill’s purpose more directly without 
making any material change to its content.29 Further, the Committee 
also changed the text of two subsections to include internal 
references in the proposed statutory text. For example, Section 2—
which sought to amend Code section 35-3-4.3(b)—now reads “the 
subpoena issued pursuant to subsection (a) of this Code section,”30 
instead of simply stating “the subpoena for production.”31 The 
Committee made no substantive changes.32 
The Senate read the bill for the second time on February 12, 2018, 
and for the third time on February 28, 2018.33 No floor amendments 
were offered. The Senate passed the Committee substitute as 
amended on February 28, 2018, by a unanimous vote of 50 to 0.34 
Consideration and Passage by the House 
Representative Andrew Welch (R-110th) sponsored SB 336 in the 
Georgia House of Representatives.35 The House read the bill for the 
first time on March 1, 2018, and committed it to the House Judiciary 
Non-Civil Committee.36 The bill was read in the House for the 
second time on March 5, 2018.37 On March 12, 2018, the Judiciary 
                                                                                                                 
 26. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 336, Jan. 22, 2018. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Compare SB 336, as introduced, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with SB 336 (SCS), 2018 Ga. Gen. 
Assemb. 
 29. Compare SB 336 (SCS), Title, p. 1, ll. 1–7, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with SB 336, as introduced, 
Title, p. 1, ll. 1–7, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
 30. SB 336 (SCS), § 2, p. 2, l. 56, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
 31. SB 336, as introduced, § 2, p. 2, l. 49, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
 32. Compare SB 336, as introduced, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with SB 336 (SCS), 2018 Ga. Gen. 
Assemb. 
 33. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 336, Feb. 28, 2018. 
 34. Id.; Georgia Senate Voting Record, SB 336, Vote #533 (Feb. 28, 2018). 
 35. SB 336 Bill Tracking, supra note 25. 
 36. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 336, Mar. 1, 2018. 
 37. Id. 
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Non-Civil Committee amended the bill in part and favorably reported 
the bill by substitute.38 
The Committee added HB 623, then pending in the House, to SB 
336 by substitute, making significant changes to the length and 
substance of SB 336. Specifically, these changes took SB 336’s two 
former sections and added twenty-two subsections and a completely 
revised third section.39 These changes were all directed at allowing 
the Georgia Crime Information Center to retain fingerprints of 
individuals who were going through background checks for an 
employer or agency that participated in the GBI’s fingerprinting 
program, which was the content of HB 623.40 The Committee 
changed the title of SB 336 to reflect these substantive changes.41 
The Committee’s proposed change to SB 336 required updating 
several sections of Georgia’s Code. Section 1A-1 added a paragraph, 
(a)(1)(F) to Code section 35-3-33, which would allow the Georgia 
Crime Information Center to “[o]btain and file fingerprints, 
descriptions, photographs, and any other pertinent identifying data on 
persons who”42 may be fingerprinted for background checks under 
Georgia or federal law.43 Such fingerprints are to be kept “separately 
from records relating to the identification of criminals.”44 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. 
 39. Compare SB 336, as passed Senate, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with SB 336 (HCS), 2018 Ga. Gen. 
Assemb. 
 40. SB 336 (HCS), Title, p. 1, ll. 5–14, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb. (amended to now read that SB 336 
will “allow the Georgia Crime Information Center to retain fingerprints of certain individuals under 
certain circumstances”); see Non-Civil Judiciary Video, supra note 9; id. at 47 min., 30 sec. (remarks by 
Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)); see also HB 623 (HCS) 2017 Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
 41. SB 336 (HCS), Title, p. 1, ll. 5–14, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb. The Committee’s version of the title 
read that SB 336 was intended to do the following: 
[T]o allow the Georgia Crime Information Center to retain fingerprints of certain individuals 
under certain circumstances and submit such fingerprints to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation; to provide for an exchange of information to certain entities; to provide for 
removal of fingerprints under certain circumstances; to provide for fees; to amend Titles 20, 
31, 37, and 49 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to education, health, 
mental health, and social services, respectively, so as to allow the Georgia Bureau of 
Investigation and, as authorized, the Federal Bureau of Investigation to retain fingerprints 
when an agency or entity is participating in the bureau’s program. 
Id. 
 42. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-33 (2018). 
 43. SB 336 (HCS), § 1A-1, p. 3, ll. 68–80, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb. (making a change to the law that 
exempts fingerprints submitted to obtain or renew a weapons carry license). 
 44. Id. § 1A-1, p. 3, ll. 77–78. 
7
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The Committee’s new Section 1A-2 further amended Code section 
35-3-33 to allow the fingerprints obtained under the new paragraph to 
be submitted to the FBI if requested; require that fingerprints 
obtained under the new paragraph be removed within ten days of 
notification that the individual is no longer employed by or otherwise 
affiliated with the requesting entity or when the entity is no longer 
participating in the program; and allow the GBI to charge an annual 
fee of up to $500 to any non-state entity “that desires to participate in 
the [fingerprinting] program.”45 
The Committee also added subsections that amended the Georgia 
Code to adapt to this new change to the GBI fingerprinting program. 
The first of these subsections sought to change Code section 
20-1A-31.46 In addition to non-substantive grammatical changes, the 
Committee added that the “time frames set forth in this subsection 
shall not apply when fingerprints have been retained by the 
department due to its participation in the [fingerprinting] program.”47 
Similarly, in addition to comparable non-substantive grammatical 
changes, this same time frame language was proposed to be added to 
Code sections 20-1A-32, 20-1A-38, 20-1A-39, 31-7-258, 49-5-62, 
49-5-68, and 49-5-69.1.48 
The Committee further changed several Code sections to indicate 
that if the relevant department was participating in the fingerprint 
program, the GBI and FBI “shall be authorized to retain fingerprints 
obtained” under the program “and the department shall notify the 
individual whose fingerprints were taken of the parameters of such 
retention.”49 This notification language was proposed to be added to 
Code sections 20-1A-34, 31-2-9, 35-3-33, 31-7-254, 31-7-259, 
37-1-28, 49-2-14, 49-2-14.1, 49-5-62, 49-5-64, 49-5-69.1, and 
49-5-111.50 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Id. § 1A-2, pp. 3–4, ll. 82–101. 
 46. Id. § 2-1, pp. 4–5, ll. 104–06. 
 47. Id. § 2-1, pp. 4–5, ll. 144–46. 
 48. Id. § 2-2, pp. 5–6, ll. 161–66; SB 336 (HCS), § 2-4, pp. 6–7, ll. 197–98, 212–14, 2018 Ga. Gen. 
Assemb.; id. § 2-5, pp. 7–8, ll. 216–18, 255–58; id. § 2-9, pp. 10–11, ll. 313–15, 330–32, 358–
61; id. § 2-14, pp. 12–13, ll. 401–03, 426–28; Id. § 2-17, pp. 14, ll. 478–82; id. § 2-18, pp. 15, ll. 484–
86, 491–93. 
 49. See, e.g., SB 336 (HCS), § 2-3, p. 6, ll. 191–95, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
 50. Id.; id. § 2-6, p. 9, ll. 274–82; id. § 2-7, p. 9, ll. 284–91; id. § 2-8, pp. 9–10, ll. 293–95, 307–
11; id. § 2-10, p. 11, ll. 368–72; SB 336 (HCS), § 2-11, pp. 11–12, ll. 374–81, 2018 Ga. Gen. 
Assemb.; id. § 2-12, p. 12, ll. 383–90; id. § 2-13, p. 12, ll. 392–99; id. § 2-14, pp. 12–13, ll. 401–03, 
8
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Finally, the Committee’s revised version amended Code section 
49-5-63 to adapt it to the new fingerprinting program, changing the 
section to read that any employee other than a director “who receives 
a preliminary records check determination that is satisfactory shall 
not be required to obtain a fingerprint records check when 
fingerprints have been retained by the department due to its 
participation in the program.”51 
SB 336 was read for the third time in the House on March 19, 
2018.52 The House passed the Committee substitute of SB 336 on 
March 19, 2018, by a majority vote of 113 to 59.53 
The Senate agreed to the House substitute on March 29, 2018, by a 
vote of 46 to 0.54 The House then sent the bill to Governor Nathan 
Deal (R) on April 5, 2018.55 Governor Deal signed the bill into law 
on May 6, 2018, and the bill became effective on July 1, 2018.56 
The Act 
Part I 
Part I of the Act amends Code section 35-3-4.1, relating to 
subpoenas to produce electronic communication service records for 
computers or electronic devices used in furtherance of certain 
offenses against minors, and Code section 35-3-4.3, relating to the 
subpoena power for investigations of violations involving trafficking 
of persons for labor or sexual servitude.57 The legislature amended 
these Code sections to provide greater protection for victims of 
sexual abuse by preventing communication carriers from notifying 
subscribers suspected of such crimes of subpoenas issued against 
them.58 Otherwise, suspects notified of such subpoenas could thwart 
                                                                                                                 
422–26; id. § 2-16, p. 14, ll. 459–60, 472–76; id. § 2-18, p. 15, ll. 484–91; SB 336 (HCS), § 2-19, p. 15, 
ll. 495–500, 2018 Ga. Gen. Assemb. (referring only to the GBI and not the FBI). 
 51. Id. § 2-15, p. 14, ll. 452–55. 
 52. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 336, Mar. 19, 2018. 
 53. Id.; Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, SB 336, #728 (Mar. 19, 2018). 
 54. Georgia Senate Voting Record, SB 336, Vote #782 (Mar. 29, 2018). 
 55. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 336, Apr. 5, 2018. 
 56. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 35-3-33 (2018). 
 57. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 1-1, at 508–09. 
 58. Video Recordings of Senate Meeting at 1 hr., 59 min., 43 sec. (Feb. 28, 2018) (remarks by Sen. 
Renee Unterman (R-45th)), https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=10&v=6qxmnnlOFls 
9
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investigators by simply deleting incriminating material from their 
computers.59 
Section 1-1 adds subsection (a)(3) to Code section 353-4.1, 
providing that “[a] provider of electronic communication service or 
remote computing service shall not provide notification of the 
subpoena issued pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection to the 
subscriber or customer of such service.”60 Section 1-2 adds similar 
language to Code section 35-3-4.3 as new subsection (b), relabeling 
the previous subsection (b) as subsection (c).61 
Part IA 
Part IA of the Act amends Code section 35-3-33, relating to the 
powers and duties of the Georgia Crime Information Center (the 
Center).62 The purpose of Part IA is to allow the Center to retain and 
submit to the FBI fingerprints for individuals subject to fingerprint 
based criminal history checks by either Georgia or federal law for 
employment or licensing purposes.63 This practice is known as the 
Retained Applicant Fingerprint Background Check program or the 
“Rapback” program.64 
Section 1A-1 adds subsection (a)(1)(F) to Code section 35-3-33, 
creating an additional class of people for which the Center may 
obtain and file fingerprints.65 Specifically, the Center may now 
collect fingerprints for employees subject to fingerprint background 
checks.66 However, the fingerprints collected under the Rapback 
program must be retained in a secure location separate from the 
                                                                                                                 
[https://perma.cc/P5WW-CVD4]. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 1-1, at 508. 
 61. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 1-2, at 508. 
 62. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 1A-1, at 508–09. 
 63. Video Recordings of Non-Civil Judiciary Committee Meeting, at 3 min., 5 sec. (Feb. 26, 2018) 
(remarks by Rep. Andrew Welch (R-110th)), https://livestream.com/accounts/ 
19771755/events/7993559/videos/170754965 [https://perma.cc/B9KN-B8CP]. 
 64. Next Generation Identification (NGI), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-other-biometrics/ngi [https://perma.cc/E9MS-XDGD] 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2018); Rapback, OHIO DEP’T OF DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, 
http://dodd.ohio.gov/CountyBoards/Resources/Pages/Rapback.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q2GZ-5GSK] 
(last visited September 17, 2018) (providing origin of “Rapback” abbreviation). 
 65. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 1A-1, at 509. 
 66. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-33(a)(1)(F) (2018) 
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fingerprints collected under the criminal system.67 Further, the Center 
may not retain fingerprints submitted for obtaining a weapons carry 
license.68 
Section 1A-2 adds subsections (a)(18)–(20) to Code section 
35-3-33.69 These subsections clarify the Center’s responsibilities in 
implementing the Rapback program.70 The Center must now submit 
fingerprints collected under the program to the FBI.71 The Center 
must also remove a person’s fingerprints collected under the program 
within ten days after it receives notice that the person no longer 
works for a participating organization, or when an organization 
decides to no longer participate in the program.72 The Center must 
inform the FBI when it deletes the fingerprints under these 
circumstances.73 Finally, the Center may collect an annual subscriber 
fee of up to $500.00 for any non-state agency participating in the 
program.74 
Part II 
Although prior versions provided a much more expansive 
implementation of the new fingerprint check program, the Act 
focuses only on DECAL, DHS, DCH, and DBHDD.75 Section 2 of 
the Act amends statutes governing fingerprint background checks for 
these agencies. Broadly, the amendments introduce notification and 
retention requirements and provide that repeated fingerprint 
collections are not necessary for participants in the new fingerprint 
collection program. 
Section 2-1 amends Code section 20-1A-31, relating to records 
check applications for potential employees and fingerprint records 
checks.76 First, the Act amends subsection (a) by specifying that the 
time frames described in that subsection do not apply when 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 1A-2, at 509–10. 
 70. Id. 
 71. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-33(a)(18) (2018). 
 72. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-33(a)(19) (2018). 
 73. Id. 
 74. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-33(a)(20) (2018). 
 75. Non-Civil Judiciary Video, supra note 9. 
 76. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-1, at 510–11. 
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fingerprints have been retained under the Rapback program.77 
Additionally, the Act amends subsection (b) by clarifying that 
employees do not need to have their fingerprints checked every five 
years if their fingerprints have been retained under the Rapback 
program.78 Additionally, the Act includes non-substantive grammar 
changes throughout this Code section.79 
Section 2-2 amends Code section 20-1A-32, relating to program 
license or commission applicants, records check requirements, and 
change of ownership.80 The Act adds subsection (d), which specifies 
that the time frames described in that Code section do not apply when 
fingerprints have been retained under the Rapback program.81 
Section 2-3 amends Code section 20-1A-34, relating to fingerprint 
checks on the national level, satisfactory determination prior to 
employment, and additional records checks.82 The Act amends 
subsection (b) by clarifying that employees do not need to have their 
fingerprints checked every five years if their fingerprints have been 
retained under the Rapback program.83 The Act also adds subsection 
(c), which states that the GBI and FBI may retain fingerprints 
obtained through the Rapback program if the department is a 
participating organization.84 The department must now notify the 
person whose fingerprints were taken of the parameters of such 
retention.85 Finally, the Act includes non-substantive grammar 
changes throughout this Code section.86 
Section 2-4 amends Code section 20-1A-38, relating to change of 
directors and records check requirements.87 The Act amends 
subsection (a) by specifying that the time frames described in 
subsection (a) do not apply when fingerprints have been retained 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. at 511. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 510–11. 
 80. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-2, at 511. 
 81. Id. 
 82. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-3, at 511–12. 
 83. Id. at 512. 
 84. Id. 
 85. O.C.G.A. § 20-1A-34(c) (2018). 
 86. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-3, at 511–12. 
 87. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-4, at 512–13. 
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under the Rapback program.88 The Act also includes non-substantive 
syntax changes.89 
Section 2-5 amends Code section 20-1A-39, relating to potential 
employees, current employees and directors, and records check 
requirements.90 The Act amends subsection (a) by specifying that the 
time frames described in that subsection do not apply when 
fingerprints have been retained under the Rapback program.91 The 
Act also amends subsection (c) by clarifying that employees do not 
need to have their fingerprints checked every five years if their 
fingerprints have been retained under the Rapback program.92 
Additionally, the Act includes non-substantive grammar changes 
throughout this Code section.93 
Section 2-6 amends Code section 31-2-9, relating to records check 
requirements for certain health care facilities.94 The Act adds 
subsection (g), which states that the GBI and FBI may retain 
fingerprints obtained through the Rapback program if the department 
is a participating organization.95 Subsection (g) also requires the 
department to notify the person whose fingerprints were taken of the 
parameters of such retention.96 
Section 2-7 amends Code section 31-2A-7, relating to “conviction 
data,” to authorize departments to receive data from law enforcement 
relevant to employment decisions and criminal history information.97 
The Act adds subsection (h), which states that the GBI and FBI may 
retain fingerprints obtained through the Rapback program if the 
department is a participating organization.98 Subsection (h) also 
requires the department to notify the person whose fingerprints were 
taken of the parameters of such retention.99 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-5, at 513–14. 
 91. Id. at 514. 
 92. Id. 
 93. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-5, at 513–14. 
 94. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-6, at 514. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-7, at 514. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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Section 2-8 amends Code section 31-7-254, relating to the 
transmission of the director’s fingerprints to the Georgia Crime 
Information Center for review and notification to the department of 
its findings.100 The GBI and FBI may retain fingerprints obtained 
through the Rapback program if the department is a participating 
organization.101 The department must also notify the person whose 
fingerprints were taken of the retention.102 
Section 2-9 amends Code section 31-7-258, relating to the change 
of facility director, notification to department, and effect of 
department determination.103 The Act amends subsections (a) and (c) 
by specifying that the time frames described in those subsections do 
not apply when fingerprints have been retained under the Rapback 
program.104 Additionally, the Act includes non-substantive grammar 
changes throughout this Code section.105 
Section 2-10 amends Code section 31-7-259, relating to 
preliminary records check determinations.106 The GBI and FBI may 
retain fingerprints obtained through the Rapback program if the 
department is a participating organization.107 The department must 
also notify the person whose fingerprints were taken of the 
parameters of such retention.108 
Section 2-11 amends Code section 37-1-28, relating to conviction 
data.109 The Act adds subsection (g), which states that the GBI and 
FBI may retain fingerprints obtained through the Rapback program if 
the department is a participating organization.110 The department 
must also notify the person whose fingerprints were taken of the 
parameters of such retention.111 
Section 2-12 amends Code section 49-2-14, relating to record 
searches for conviction data on prospective employees.112 The Act 
                                                                                                                 
 100. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-8, at 515. 
 101. O.C.G.A. § 31-7-254 (2018). 
 102. Id. 
 103. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-9, at 515–16. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-10, at 516–17. 
 107. O.C.G.A. § 31-7-259(n) (2018). 
 108. Id. 
 109. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-11, at 517. 
 110. Id. 
 111. O.C.G.A. § 37-1-28(g) (2018). 
 112. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-12, at 517. 
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adds subsection (i), which states that the GBI and FBI may retain 
fingerprints obtained through the Rapback program if the department 
is a participating organization.113 Subsection (i) also requires the 
department to notify the person whose fingerprints were taken of the 
parameters of such retention.114 
Section 2-13 amends Code section 49-2-14.1, relating to 
definitions and records check requirements for licensing certain 
facilities.115 The Act adds subsection (g), which states that the GBI 
and FBI may retain fingerprints obtained through the Rapback 
program if the department is a participating organization.116 
Subsection (g) also requires the department to notify the person 
whose fingerprints were taken of the parameters of such retention.117 
Section 2-14 amends Code section 49-5-62, relating to records 
check applications for directors of new facilities and preliminary 
records checks for employees.118 The Act adds subsection (b), which 
states that the GBI and FBI may retain fingerprints obtained through 
the Rapback program if the department is a participating 
organization.119 Subsection (b) also requires the department to notify 
the person whose fingerprints were taken of the retention.120 
Furthermore, subsection (b) specifies that the time frames described 
do not apply when fingerprints have been retained under the Rapback 
program.121 The Act also includes non-substantive grammar changes 
throughout this Code section.122 
Section 2-15 amends Code section 49-5-63, relating to notice of 
determination, issue of license, and effect of unsatisfactory 
determination.123 The amendment specifies that any employee other 
than the director who receives a satisfactory records check does not 
need to obtain a fingerprint records check if that employee’s 
fingerprints have been retained by the department under the Rapback 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-13, at 517. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-14, at 517–18. 
 119. Id. at 518. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-14, at 517–18. 
 123. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-15, at 518–19. 
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program.124 The amendment also includes non-substantive grammar 
changes throughout this Code section.125 
Section 2-16 amends Code section 49-5-64, relating to fingerprint 
records checks.126 The Act retains subsection (a) and adds subsection 
(b), which states that the GBI and FBI may retain fingerprints 
obtained through the Rapback program if the department is a 
participating organization.127 Subsection (b) also requires the 
department to notify the person whose fingerprints were taken of the 
retention.128 
Section 2-17 amends Code section 49-5-68, relating to change of 
director.129 The Act adds subsection (d), which specifies that the time 
frames described in this Code section do not apply when the 
fingerprints have been retained under the Rapback program.130 
Section 2-18 amends Code section 49-5-69.1, relating to 
fingerprint and preliminary records checks for foster homes, notice of 
results, violations, and foster parents known to have criminal 
records.131 The Act adds subsection (f), which specifies that the time 
frames described in this Code section do not apply when fingerprints 
have been retained under the Rapback program.132 The GBI and FBI 
may retain fingerprints obtained through the Rapback program if the 
department is a participating organization.133 Further, the department 
must notify the person whose fingerprints were taken of the 
parameters of such retention.134 
Section 2-19 amends Code section 49-5-111, relating to employers 
authorized to make records checks.135 The Act revises subsection (c) 
by providing that the GBI and FBI may retain fingerprints obtained 
through the Rapback program if the department is a participating 
                                                                                                                 
 124. Id. at 519. 
 125. Id. at 518–19. 
 126. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-16, at 519. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 217, at 519. 
 130. Id. 
 131. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-18, at 519–20. 
 132. Id. at 520. 
 133. O.C.G.A. § 49-5-69.1(f) (2018). 
 134. Id. 
 135. 2018 Ga. Laws 507, § 2-19, at 520. 
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organization.136 The amendment also requires the department to 
notify the person whose fingerprints were taken of the retention.137 
Analysis 
Strengthening Law Enforcement 
The original form of SB 336 sought to prohibit Internet providers 
from notifying customers of subpoenas against them. Such a 
prohibition allows law enforcement to access the data authorized 
under the subpoena before the user would have a chance to know of 
the subpoena. Prior to the passage of SB 336, an Internet service 
provider was able to, at its discretion, inform customers of a 
subpoena against them, although law enforcement could urge the 
service provider not to do so.138 If informed of a subpoena against 
them, the customers could have erased, removed, or otherwise 
destroyed the data sought by law enforcement in an effort to escape 
conviction.139 As the law stands today, these customers will not know 
of the subpoena seeking their data before law enforcement has the 
chance to act on it. Fundamentally, such a law strengthens law 
enforcement’s power at the expense of suspects having knowledge of 
subpoenas against them. 
The law is a reflection of a government seeking to shore up the 
power of law enforcement against a rising wave of technology that is 
increasingly more difficult to track. Georgia is certainly not the first 
state to pass such a law; many states have taken this step or similar 
ones in recent years, including Florida, Vermont, Illinois, and West 
Virginia.140 Federal law enforcement is also struggling with how to 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Levenson, supra note 18. 
 139. See, e.g., Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Davis, No. 05-0316, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50955, at *4–
5 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2006). 
 140. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.24 (West 2018) (requiring Internet provider in certain circumstances to 
create backup copy of communications “[w]ithout notifying the subscriber”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/115-17b (West 2018) (allowing court to prohibit disclosure of subpoena for up to ninety days in 
certain circumstances); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 8103 (West 2018) (permitting delay of up to ninety 
days of required customer notification in “emergency” circumstances); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1G-
2(e) (West 2018) (“The electronic communications system or service . . . shall not disclose the existence 
of the subpoena or its response to the subpoena to the account holder identified in the subpoena.”). 
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handle increasingly elusive data and tech companies, which will 
cooperate with law enforcement only if legally compelled to do so.141 
Thus, the introduction of SB 336 exemplifies Georgia’s interest in 
supporting law enforcement against new technology by choosing to 
give law enforcement more tools to fight against disappearing data. 
However, SB 336, in its final form, was more than just an attempt 
to stop Internet service providers from informing their customers of 
subpoenas against them. SB 336 went through substantial changes in 
the House, where the Judiciary Non-Civil Committee added the 
substance of HB 623, then pending in the House, to SB 336 by 
Committee substitute.142 These changes sought to allow the Georgia 
Crime Information Center to retain fingerprints of individuals who 
were going through background checks for an employer or agency 
who participated in the GBI’s fingerprinting program. 
SB 336, before passage, became a bipartite bill; it would prohibit 
Internet service providers from notifying customers of subpoenas 
against them and would also give the Georgia Crime Information 
Center more power by allowing it to retain certain individuals’ 
fingerprints. Both portions of SB 336 thus serve to increase the 
power of law enforcement, reflecting a commitment by the Georgia 
legislature to better equip state law enforcement. 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Most technology companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley, now publicly state their 
disinclination to cooperate with federal prosecutors unless faced with a court order compelling them to 
do so. See, e.g., GUIDELINES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES, TWITTER, INC. (2017) (“Non-
public information about Twitter users will not be released to law enforcement except in response to 
appropriate legal process such as a subpoena, court order, or other valid legal process.”); LEGAL 
PROCESS FOR USER DATA REQUESTS FAQ, GOOGLE, INC. (2018), 
https://support.google.com/transparencyreport/answer/7381738 [https://perma.cc/9UVQ-X3ER] (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2018) (“When we receive such a request, our team reviews the request to make sure it 
satisfies legal requirements and Google’s policies. Generally speaking, for us to produce any data, the 
request must be made in writing, signed by an authorized official of the requesting agency and issued 
under an appropriate law. If we believe a request is overly broad, we’ll seek to narrow it.”); LEGAL 
PROCESS GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNMENT AND LAW ENFORCEMENT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, 
APPLE, INC. (2017) (“For all requests from government and law enforcement agencies within the United 
States . . . Apple will only provide content in response to a search warrant issued upon a showing of 
probable cause . . . . In instances where Apple determines that there is no valid legal basis or where a 
request is considered to be unclear, inappropriate or over-broad Apple will challenge or reject the 
request.”). 
 142. See supra text accompanying notes 39–51. 
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Constitutional Concerns 
Rather than challenge the government’s attempts to access 
customer data simply out of spite, technology companies like 
Microsoft have challenged such attempts on constitutional 
grounds.143 Because federal law allows for virtually unlimited ninety 
day extensions at the discretion of the court, Microsoft, along with 
other technology companies, has argued that the absence of any set 
timeframe for holding customer data without informing the customer 
impedes Microsoft’s ability to exercise its free speech right to inform 
its customers of actions affecting their private data, meaning the 
government is violating the First Amendment of the Constitution.144 
Further, Microsoft argues that because customers have no awareness 
of the request for their data, it can bring a challenge under the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution.145 Microsoft has argued that such 
constitutional violations erode customer trust in Microsoft’s services, 
making it sufficient to allow Microsoft to bring a claim on the 
customer’s behalf.146 Some technology companies that have used this 
constitutional argument have found their cases dismissed on 
procedural grounds.147 
Although a technology company has not yet directly challenged 
Georgia’s law, it stands to be contested on the same grounds as 
previous challenges to the federal Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act. Such a challenge could harm how Georgia is viewed by 
technology companies seeking to operate within its borders. This 
concern is especially relevant in light of the legislature’s recent 
public attempts to cater to technology companies.148 To avoid such 
                                                                                                                 
 143. See Joel Margolis, Should a Service Provider Notify Customers When They Are Subject to Law 
Enforcement Investigations?, SUBSENTIO (2018), http://www.subsentio.com/service-provider-notify-
customers-subject-law-enforcement-investigations/ [https://perma.cc/YX2H-4P7W]. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id.  
This legal framework [holding that service providers cannot bring claims on behalf 
of their subscribers] was upheld in two recent cases involving LEA demands on 
Internet providers for subscriber information. One case in 2012 dismissed a Fourth 
Amendment motion by Twitter; the other denied a similar claim in 2015 by 
Facebook. 
Id. 
 148. See, e.g., Richard Elliot, State Leaders Update Amazon on Transit Expansion with Hopes to Win 
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challenges, Georgia could consider limiting the timeframe that law 
enforcement is allowed to access consumer data without notification, 
instead of maintaining the currently open-ended language of the 
statute. 
Richard J. Uberto Jr. & Brooke Wilner 
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